TAXPAYER REMEDY
zens would become private attorneys general, supplementing the government's inherently limited prosecutorial resources.
The concept of such taxpayer suits is hardly novel. In England, during the Middle Ages, a shortage of law enforcement officers was offset by creating authority for prosecutions by private litigants. 4 In fact, "[m]uch reliance was placed upon common informers to secure enforcement of laws affecting public order and safety." '5 Likewise, during the American Civil War, the exposure of massive fraud in the procurement process led to the adoption of authority for suits by private citizens to recover money for the government. 6 Quite simply, one well-established technique for increasing enforcement efforts is to allow taxpayer litigation on behalf of the government. Taxpayers, motivated by an opportunity to receive a share of the judgment, would greatly supplant federal law enforcement resources.
Unfortunately, today such suits by private citizens are not allowed. Restrictive doctrines limiting who has standing to sue in federal court preclude taxpayer actions except where they are specifically authorized by statute. 7 Currently, no statute exists to permit such litigation.
This article proposes that Congress enact a statute granting taxpayers standing to sue to recover money for the government in cases of fraud and corruption. Section I describes the need for such legislation. The magnitude of fraud, the inadequacy of current criminal and civil sanctions, and the desirability of taxpayer litigation are discussed in this section. Section II details the current barriers to taxpayer class actions, focusing both on restrictive standing doctrines and the absence of statutory authority for private litigation. Finally, a suggested legislative approach is outlined and potential objections to it are analyzed.
I. GOVERNMENT FRAUD AND CORRUPTION: THE NEED FOR A TAXPAYER REMEDY

A. THE MAGNITUDE OF FRAUD AND CORRUPTION AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT
The size and pervasiveness of the United States government has no precedent in history. In 1980, the federal budget was over $579 billion.
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that one to ten percent of federal funds in programs such as Medicaid, food stamps, and Defense Department purchasing is lost through fraud. 17 A 1980 inquiry conducted by the Republican Study Committee concluded that $34 billion in "waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement" could be saved. 18 Other estimates of money lost through fraud and waste range as high as $51 billion to $77 billion a year. 19 Most of these losses occur in one of three ways. "Program fraud" involves fraud against the United States government in its direct provision of services and benefits to individuals, businesses, and other levels of government. 2 0 "Contract fraud" occurs when the government enters into contracts with private industry for property, materials and services. 2 ' Finally, there is fraud by public officials, including receipt of bribes and kickbacks. 2 2 Developing a clear picture of the magnitude of fraud and corruption requires an examination of each type of illicit activity.
Since the New Deal, the federal government has administered a vast array of social programs designed to provide benefits to citizens and businesses. In part, the benefit programs exist to help the needy. Programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and federal housing subsidies, reflect society's commitment to assist those who, for whatever reason, are unable to take 17 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 9. Additionally, a Department of Justice estimate puts the loss to taxpayers from violations of federal regulations by corporations at $10 to $20 billion each year. LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 16 (1979) . 18 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 10, col. 5. 19 Id. at 1, col. 2. In part, the tremendous variance in estimates of losses from fraud reflects the impossibility of precise measurement. In part, too, there is some difficulty in defining the terms "fraud and abuse." See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS 14-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as L.E.A.A., Fraud and Abuse]. For the purpose of this article fraud is defined by its traditional common law meaning: "all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue advantage is taken of another." 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
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ER WIN CHEMERINSKY care of themselves. 2 3 Anti-poverty programs have grown tremendously over the last twenty years. Income transfer payments rose from 4.1 percent to 10.7 percent of the Gross National Product between 1956 and 1978.24 One prominent example of this increase is in health expenditures where federal spending rose from $7.4 billion to $68 billion between 1966 and 1979. 25 Benefit programs, however, have not been limited to helping the needy. Businesses, too, have been major recipients of federal largesse. For example, the farm income stabilization program involves direct government payments to owners of farm land. The government provides price supports and income in years of abundant supply to discourage excess production, and funds the creation of grain reserves for use in years of short supply. 2 6 Federal money supports commodities including cotton, tobacco, grain, peanuts and sorghum. Similarly, the Small Business Administration oversees a variety of loan programs to aid business growth and development. Each of these benefit programs is beset by fraud, committed both by recipients and by third party providers. Recipients, those persons who directly receive program benefits, commit fraud by misrepresenting eligibility, falsifying data such as income, birth date, social security identification, veteran status, and marital status. 2 8 A well-publicized case of a major fraud accomplished through false statements involved the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and its receipt of $92 million in expropriation insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).29 After ITT's assets were nationalized in Chile, ITT applied for compensation from OPIC. As a condition to receipt of aid, ITT officials certified that the company had no involvement in domestic politics in Chile.
3 0 Pursuant to this certification, ITT received government compensation. Subsequent Congressional hearings revealed that ITT officials had perjured themselves and that the company was not legally entitled to the money it received.
3 1
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Recipients also defraud programs by creating "ghost eligibles," fictitious persons who are awarded benefits. 3 2 A well-constructed plan for creating "ghost eligibles" can cost the government millions of dollars. For example, two individuals with vast landholdings in west Texas devised a scheme which defrauded the federal government of more than $4,500,000 through the creation of "ghost eligibles. ' 33 Under the Upland Cotton Program 34 each individual owning or renting land was entitled to a maximum subsidy of $55,000.3 5 To circumvent this payment limitation, bogus leases and fraudulent representations on government forms were executed to create the appearance of having dozens of persons eligible to receive payments, when in fact, only two were legally entitled to receive subsidies.
Fraud in benefit programs also occurs through the actions of third party providers. 3 6 In many benefit programs, government agencies contract with the private sector to deliver services to qualified recipients. For example, in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, pharmacies, hospitals, nursing homes, and physicians are third party providers, supplying medical services to eligible beneficiaries. 3 8 Fraud by providers in these health programs alone is significant. 3 9 Numerous examples exist of submission of false claims, delivery of unnecessary services, and delib-ER WIN CHEMERINSK Y crate overbilling in the Medicare and Medicaid systems.
40
A second major area of fraud is in government contracts. The government purchases billions of dollars worth of goods and services. 4 1 Investigations, audits, and prosecutions indicate that the procurement process is regularly exploited for illegal profits. The government loses billions of dollars each year through claims for payments for non-delivery of goods and services, intentional overcharging, and collusion among contractors and suppliers to frustrate competitive bidding processes. 42 A few examples illustrate the techniques and pervasiveness of contract fraud.
Major grain companies intentionally defrauded the United States Food for Peace Program by providing grain of a quality inferior to that which they contracted to provide. 43 This practice, together with deliberate "short-weighting," supplying less than the amount paid for, and rigging of bids, cost the government millions of dollars. 44 More generally, cost overruns on government contracts are so prevalent that some believe contractors intentionally inflate claims for millions of dollars. 45 The indictment of Litton Industries, a major defense contractor, for fraudulently overcharging the government by more than $37 million is but one example.
46
Bid-rigging is prevalent, but often never discovered. Competitive bidding is designed to allow the government to obtain goods at the lowest possible cost. 47 Companies, however, avoid the requirement for competitive bidding through collusion and mutual agreements. For example, millions of dollars in fraud were traced to contractors constructing the Byrd International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Major companies responsible for constructing the airport and a nearby road Yet another example of major contract fraud involves the Small Business Administration's minority business program. 4 9 Under this program, businesses controlled by minorities are given preference in the award of federal contracts. White-control led companies, however, established shell firms, which they controlled to qualify as minority businesses. In this way, white-controlled "fronts" "have siphoned off millions of dollars in SBA contracts by simply hiring blacks as executive officers." 5 0
Finally, fraud occurs in the form of corruption of public officials. Bribes and kickbacks are not unusual. Companies pay bribes and kickbacks to gain a competitive edge, to acquire or retain businesses or services, and to coverup provision of inferior products. 5 1 Bribes and kickbacks are frequent in programs such as Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, Small Business Administration minority business programs, the Summer Food Service, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Rehabilitation Housing Program, the Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Program, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act programs. 5 2 Public officials may be given bribes and kickbacks in exchange for awarding government contracts. Furthermore, some public officials directly defraud federal programs. As the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration explains:
Employees usually commit crimes successfully because they know how benefits are conveyed, and the timing and methods of delivery. Collusion with clients to defraud, creation of fictitious clients and client records, and creation of fictitious postal addresses to collect defrauded benefits are crimes committed by some employees as a result of their inside knowledge and their ability to use that knowledge. 
SANCTIONS
Given the magnitude of fraud and corruption, systematic imposition of criminal and civil sanctions is essential both to recoup lost money 59 and to deter others from committing fraud. 60 The government consistently "has placed heavy reliance on the criminal justice system as its main line of defense in combating program fraud and abuse." '6 1 Numerous federal laws make it a crime to defraud government programs. While criminal sanctions are one weapon, they are not by themselves sufficient to control fraud and corruption. Experts, almost without exception, agree that:
there is virtually no evidence that the criminal sanction has succeeded in controlling white collar crime. In general, deterrence has not been realized, rehabilitation has been ignored, repeat offenders have not been removed from society, and victims have not been compensated. In large measure, these results are a product of the natural limits of the criminal justice system.
69
Government sanctions, both civil and criminal, are inherently inadequate for three major reasons. First, institutional limits, the inevitable shortage of investigative and prosecutorial resources, insure the inadequacy of government enforcement efforts. 70 Fraud cases are significantly more complex and time consuming to develop than are more common crimes. 7 1 In fact, as a rule, the larger the magnitude of the fraud, the more complex and intricate the investigation is likely to be. 72 For example, prosecution of third-party providers for fraud usually requires a lengthy trial with hundreds of exhibits and witnesses. 73 Because the prosecution of these-cases "entails an enormous expenditure of. . .resources in relation to the number of cases prosecuted 
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ERWIN CHEMERINSK Y . . . comparatively few" are pursued. 7 4 Ultimately, even if resources allocated to enforcement efforts were increased, government prosecutors still would be able to deal with only a small fraction of current fraud and corruption. 75 Charles Ruff, former Watergate Special Prosecutor and Assistant Deputy Attorney General, explains: I think it is clear that we have to recognize, and this is something which I think was not recognized in earlier years, that criminal prosecution simply cannot be the answer to this problem. We cannot deal with anything much more than a very small percentage of the loss that occurs through fraud, abuse and waste, by criminal prosecutions, nor do we realistically have the resources to detect, through law enforcement personnel, those losses.
Similarly, resource limitations restrict government civil suits to a small percentage of the fraud. The total dollar amount of pending civil suits filed by the Justice Department as of March, 1978 was only $250 million. 77 Even Justice Department officials concede that this "is only a fraction of the amount defrauded the government. '78 The low level of government enforcement efforts insures not only that recovery of the sums lost through fraud will remain a small percentage, but also that deterrence will be minimal. Deterrence depends in large measure on the likelihood of punishment being imposed. 79 To the extent that limited resources mean that relatively few cases of fraud will be prosecuted, there is little to deter perpetrators of fraud. 80 Second, even in those cases prosecutors pursue, the sanctions imposed are so minimal as to provide little deterrent effect.
8 I Traditionally, penalties for white-collar crime, including fraud, have been small. The average prison sentence for all those convicted in this study was 2.8 days. 8 7 Similarly, out of 40,000 cases of fraud uncovered by investigators in the Medicare program, only 220 resulted in successful prosecution, and only 37 offenders were sentenced to prison terms. 88 Thus, the widely held conception that white-collar criminals rarely experience jail sentences or meaningful criminal sanctions is quite accurate. 89 It is highly doubtful that this pattern will change. In part, the lax approach to white-collar crime exists because perpetrators of major frauds are "usually community leaders with excellent educational backgrounds and high social status." 9 0 As such, from a sociological perspective, light sentences are easily explainable:
One reason for lenient treatment is the high degree of cultural homogeneity among the defendants, the legislators who pass the laws regulating businessmen, and the judges who determine guilt and mete out sentences to violators of those laws. Because businessmen, lawmakers and judges come from similar social backgrounds, are of similar age, have often been educated at the same universities, associate with the same people, and have similar outlooks on the world, it is not surprising that legislators and judges are unwilling to treat business offenders harshly.
Similarly, juries are likely to sympathize with white-collar defendants.92 Furthermore, because much fraud is committed by corporations, it is often difficult to identify which individuals within the business are culpable. 93 Most often in fraud cases, individuals accused and indicted plead nolo contendere and then receive mild sentences. 94 Together, these factors create a system where probation and short prison sentences 84 Ogren, supra note 69, at 962. 85 Id. Furthermore, even when jail sentences were imposed, defendants never had to serve more than one-third of their sentences before being eligible for parole. 
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are common in cases of fraud and corruption. 95 Nor are substantial fines imposed in fraud cases. In most instances, the profit received from the illegality is greater than the fine to be paid. 96 A corporation usually gains "more financially from its crimes than it pays in a fine if convicted. ' 97 And criminal sanctions do not require that the defendant repay the amount fraudulently gained. 98 Ultimately, the small penalties imposed in fraud cases insure minimal deterrence of corruption. 99 Though there are serious problems in attempting to measure the precise deterrent effect of various levels of punishment, 0 0 there is widespread agreement that substantial penalties are necessary to deter fraud.
10 1 The improbability of ever being prosecuted for fraud, combined with the likelihood of a small sentence, produces a situation where there is little to deter perpetrators.1 0 2
Finally, political pressure and corruption of public officials charged with enforcement often means that the government chooses not to bring suit or seek the imposition of criminal or civil actions. Political considerations may directly influence whether prosecutions are undertaken and if they are, who is indicted. Especially where high level government officials are implicated, the concentration of all enforcement machinery in the hands of the government may mean that no prosecutorial action will be taken. None of the above analysis is meant to suggest that criminal and civil prosecution by the government is undesirable or that it should not be pursued. Rather, the point is that government action by itself is not sufficient to control fraud. Resource limitations, minimal sanctions, and political pressure, insure that only a fraction of fraud cases ever will be One way to increase both the number of lawsuits against fraud and the size of the penalty is to permit individual taxpayers to sue to recover money for the government. In cases involving substantial government losses,' 0 5 citizens would be able to bring civil suit on behalf of the United States."' 6 The person bringing suit, if successful, would receive a fraction of the amount recovered, with the majority of the funds returned to the Treasury. Such a remedy would not substitute for government enforcement efforts, but rather would supplement them. A taxpayer's suit would ''not prevent the bringing of either a criminal action by the government
• . . or, where appropriate, an ordinary action in tort."' 0 8 The taxpayer's class action would be "an ancillary remedy, designed to add to, rather than substitute for more conventional law enforcement methods." 0 9
Authority for such suits is premised on the belief that public money or property ultimately belongs to the taxpayers and is held in trust for them by the government." 0 Thus, taxpayers have a legitimate interest 105 The statute creating authority for the taxpayer's suit would set a minimum dollar amount as a precondition for federal court jurisdiction. For example, by only allowing suits for more than $50,000 it can be insured that taxpayers' suits will focus only on major frauds. See Section 3(b) of the proposed statute infra. 106 "The taxpayer does not assert a private cause of action but, instead, that of his government. Therefore, a taxpayers' suit is essentially a 'derivative proceeding akin to a corporate shareholders' suit." Note, Taxpayers Actions: Public Invocation of theJudicia, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 397, 398 (1977) . Throughout this article the terms "citizen's suits" and "taxpayer's suits" are used interchangeably because it is expected that most citizens pay some federal taxes. The statute itself should limit plaintiffs to federal taxpayers because they can allege a monetary injury, more easily meeting the standing requirement for injury in fact. See The concept of allowing citizens' suits as a vehicle for the government to recover money is not new. In fact, in the fourteenth century, England enacted statutes allowing private individuals to initiate litigation on behalf of the Crown. 11 5 Such citizen suits were called "qui tam"
actions. 16 A qui tam suit is: an action brought by a private litigant pursuant to a statute which establishes a penalty, fine or forfeiture for a proscribed act and permits the qui tam plaintiff to recover a portion of the penalty. The private litigant, without prior approval of the government, brings suit on behalf of the government, as well as himself.
17
Qui tam actions were initially designed "to supplement England's insufficient legal machinery in order to bring more offenses to the cognizance of the courts."" 8 The private citizen, "stimulated by his share of the penalty, was expected to play a considerable part" in enforcing England's laws. 112 As one commentator expressed, citizen suits are desirable "where more effective law enforcement is desired, either because the crime involved is serious enough to require extra attention or because existing remedies are for some reason inadequate." Comment, supra note 108, at 795. As the earlier discussion demonstrated, fraud and corruption are serious crimes where prosecutorial resources are inadequate. The concept of the qui tam action is especially well-suited to dealing with fraud and corruption. As explained above, the "two primary reasons for permitting qui tam actions-insufficient police personnel and government inaction-exist today."' 25 Allowing successful plaintiffs to receive a portion of the money recovered through their efforts creates an incentive for private citizens to investigate fraud. Such non-governmental investigations are most likely to be successful in cases of "consensual crimes."126 For example, bribery involves two willing parties, both of whom consent to participate in the crime.' 2 7 Because there is no victim directly injured by the criminal act, no complaint is filed and police detection is obviously difficult. Often, however, private citizens may be aware of the scheme and lack any incentive to come forward with their information. Allowing citizen suits provides a strong incentive for individuals to act on their knowledge. In fact, it is for this reason that qui tam actions frequently have been called "informers' suits."'1 28 As one Senator, advocating authority for qui tam suits, expressed over one hundred years ago: "the old fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and 'setting a rogue to catch a rogue'. . . is the safest and most expedi- 
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ERWIN CHEMERINSKY tious way I have discovered of bringing rogues to justice. ' ' 129 Furthermore, authority for citizen suits will not only increase the investigation of fraud, but its prosecution as well. Prosecutors have inherently limited resources and can act only on a small fraction of the cases involving governmental corruption. 130 Taxpayers can supplement government prosecutions by bringing civil suits in cases where otherwise no action would be taken. Moreover, "the availability of such litigation is insurance against the instances in which the responsible prosecutors, usually political officers, are themselves allied with the action challenged .... ,,13i Especially in situations involving corruption of public officials, the "need for taxpayers' suits arises from the absence of alternative means of correcting illegal practices of government officials which would otherwise be irreparable."' 132 Additionally, in many cases, citizen suits would increase the penalties imposed by providing for recovery of the illicitly gained sums. At the very least, this would return funds to the program and provide greater benefits for recipients. 133 By recovering the full amount defrauded, and perhaps double or treble damages, the profitability of graft is significantly reduced.
In theory, the increased investigation, prosecution, and penalties should lead to greater deterrence of future fraud and corruption. Though it is impossible to estimate how much fraud would be deterred, a higher level of certainty that prosecution will occur and that larger penalties imposed should translate into less crime.1 34 Thus, citizen suits would "serve to deter future unlawful acts. . . as well as to redress past transgressions."1 35 Though such civil suits would in no way substitute for criminal prosecutions, it should be recognized that civil litigation has many advantages over criminal actions. 3 6 Civil litigation is initiated with a complaint, which can be amended. Criminal proceedings begin with, an indictment which must be founded on probable cause and cannot be 38 In criminal proceedings, proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil actions only require proof of liability to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In criminal trials, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination allows a defendant to refuse to testify and prevents any adverse inference to be drawn from the defendant's silence. By contrast, in civil proceedings, the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify in response to probative evidence offered against him.1 39 In criminal cases, the government may not appeal a verdict for the defendant. In civil actions, on the other hand, either party may appeal if it loses in the trial court.' 4°P erhaps the most important advantage of civil proceedings in cases involving fraud is the broader scope of civil discovery. In civil cases, a party "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in the pending action."' 1 4 ' The benefits of the expansive civil discovery provisions extend "beyond the particular defendant since it can be used to obtain information about the entire operation in which the defendant was involved, including the methods employed and the identities of other participants." 42 Discovery can greatly aid the investigation and detection of fraud, providing private litigants with a powerful tool for uncovering corruption.
The experience of states which allow taxpayer suits indicates that taxpayer actions could become a major weapon in the arsenal against fraud and corruption. Citizens have brought many successful suits to recover money for the government which otherwise would have been lost. 143 Likewise, the experience in foreign countries such as Australia 
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and Canada indicates that taxpayer suits can be effectively used against fraud.
14 4 Given the magnitude of graft and corruption, and the inadequacy of governmental civil and criminal sanctions, authority for taxpayer suits would be of tremendous benefit.
II. THE BARRIERS To TAXPAYER CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
Despite the desirability of citizen suits against fraud and corruption, such litigation is not currently allowed in federal courts. The law of standing bars taxpayer suits in non-constitutional cases unless they are explicitly authorized by statute. Unfortunately, the only statute which could be used as a vehicle for these actions has been interpreted so as to totally preclude taxpayer initiated proceedings.
A. STANDING BARRIERS TO TAXPAYER CLASS ACTIONS
The Concept of Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to "cases and controversies."
1 45 This constitutional mandate has been interpreted to require that a party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must allege "a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy." ' 1 46 The question of whether a particular plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy is termed standing. Standing is the determination "of whether a person is the proper party to present a particular issue to the court for adjudication." 147
The requirement that a plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy before he or she can ask the court to act is deeply embedded in the traditional notion of the powers and duties of the court. In Marbuy v. Madison, 148 Justice Marshall stated that although the courts are the final arbiters of the Constitution, their power to act is triggered only by an obligation to decide disputes properly before them. 
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has an important function as lawmaker, but may only exercise that function when two individuals "butting heads" over a particular disagreement bring their dispute to a judge. 150 Though many critics have suggested that nothing in the Constitution requires that each plaintiff be an individual who will gain or lose depending on the outcome of the case, 15 1 for two hundred years courts never have waivered on their requirement that the judicial power only may be invoked by parties with standing. 52 The standing doctrine has been justified by two policy considerations: the functioning of the courts and separation of powers.
Since courts cannot conduct investigations or actively collect information, 153 they must rely upon the parties to present sufficient evidence to delineate the issues. 15 4 A party with a stake in the outcome of the controversy presumably has had the greatest incentive to gather relevant evidence and marshal available arguments. As one renowned legal commentator observed almost a half century ago:
[C]ourts are more apt to formulate or apply rules soundly if the opposite sides are prevented from sitting around a Thus, courts have held that Article III requires that a plaintiff allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 15 6 Courts are unwilling to trust plaintiffs suing solely for ideological reasons to adequately prepare and present the issues.
15 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a "mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest" does not provide "that 'essential dimension of specificity' that informs judicial decisionmaking."' 158 Furthermore, standing requirements also are believed to improve the functioning of the courts by reducing the judiciary's caseload. Courts long have declared that without limiting litigation through a narrow standing doctrine, class suits would flood the courts' dockets.- 59 Additionally, the Supreme Court has explained the standing requirement as one "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."' 60 This reasoning defines the limits of judicial power in part as the differences between legislative and judicial functions. As an elected body, the legislature has the general consent of the voters to pass laws. In contrast, the courts' power is not obtained democratically.
1 61 Therefore, the courts have concluded that laws of broad applicability should be made by Congress, and that the courts only should decide specific concrete issues affecting the parties before them.1 62 The broader the issues addressed by a court and the broader the class of persons affected, the more a court action resembles the legislature's function. Actions brought on behalf of the public are thought to "strain the judicial function and press to the limit judicial authority.' 63 Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that:
[s]hould the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories. Such abuse ofjudicial power would properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches.1 64
Restictions on Taxpayer Standing
The Supreme Court has held that the "cases and controversies" requirement of Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate " 'a distinct and palpable injury to himself that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted." 1 6 5 Furthermore, the policy considerations de- 
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[Vol. 72 TAXPAYER REMEDY scribed above have led the Court to adopt additional prudential, nonconstitutional, standing barriers. That is, even where a plaintiff's case is constitutionally justiciable, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim. For example, a litigant normally must assert an injury that is peculiar to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather than one 'shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.' 1 66
The primary difference between the prudential bar against plaintiffs asserting generalized grievances and the constitutional standing requirements, is that Congress, by legislation, may expand standing to overcome the prudential barrier but may not abrogate the constitutional requirements. 167 Taxpayer standing is precluded by the prudential rule forbidding the assertion of a grievance "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." The Court first announced this barrier to taxpayer and citizen standing in Frothingham v. Mellon, 68 decided almost sixty years ago. In Frothingham, the plaintiff, suing as a taxpayer, sought to restrain expenditures under the federal Maternity Act of 1921, which provided financial grants to the states to reduce maternal and infant mortality. The plaintiff, Ms. Frothingham, asserted that the expenditures violated the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the states. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing because her "interest in the moneys of the Treasury. . . is comparatively minute and indeterminable." 69 The Court held that federal court review must be based on a plaintiff's alleging a direct injury and "not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."' 170 Similarly, a few years later in Ex Parte Levitt,1 7 1 the Supreme Court ruled that citizenship is not in itself a source of standing. Levitt involved a citizen's suit to have Justice Hugo Black's appointment to the Supreme Court invalidated on the grounds that Justice Black had voted, while a Senator, to increase Supreme Court justices' retirement benefits. This was alleged to violate Article I, § 6 of the Constitution, 166 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 99-100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499). 
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ER WIN CHEMERINSKY which states that "No Senator ... shall during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office the emoluments whereof shall have increased during such time." The Court, however, held that the plaintiff lacked standing because he did not assert a direct injury and "it is not sufficient [for standing] that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
Fro/hingham and Levitt establish the prudential bar to taxpayer and citizen standing. With only one notable exception, this rule has been applied repeatedly and continues in force today. The exception in which taxpayer standing was permitted is Flast v. Cohen. 173 In Flast, the Court upheld a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to parochial schools as violating the clause of the first amendment forbidding the establishment of religion. Both the majority and the dissent in Flast agreed that the rule preventing plaintiffs from asserting generalized grievances was prudential rather than constitutional in origin. 174 The majority concluded that this prudential bar should not apply in cases where the taxpayer establishes both "a logical link between [the status asserted] and the type of legislative enactment attacked" and a "nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. ' 175 In Flast, the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause of the first amendment created a specific limitation on the taking and spending power, thereby creating a sufficient "nexus" to justify taxpayer standing. 179 the Supreme Court clearly restated the bar against taxpayer and citizen standing. In Richardson, the plaintiff suing as a federal taxpayer, contended that the statutes providing for the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency budget were unconstitutional. The plaintiff argued that such secret expenditures violated the Constitution's requirement that "a regular statement and account of the receipt and expenditure of all public money shall be published from time to time."' 180 The Court held that the plaintiff was "seeking 'to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievences about the conduct of 
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[Vol. 72 TAXPAYER REMEDY government.' "181 Accordingly, the Court ruled that because the plaintiff's interest as a taxpayer was "undifferentiated and common to all members of the public" he lacked standing. 182 Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs, suing as taxpayers and citizens, lacked standing to raise the claim that the incompatability clause of Article I, § 6 "renders a member of Congress ineligible to hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve during his continuance in office." 18 3 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion concluded that "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance" was not sufficient to justify standing. 84 A citizen or taxpayer cannot claim standing if his or her adversely affected interest is "held in common by all members of the public."
185
After Richardson and Schlesinger, taxpayer and citizen standing in federal court is virtually eliminated. Under current law, it appears that a taxpayer only has standing if he or she alleges a challenge to expenditures based on the Establishment Clause.
18 6 As such, a taxpayer may not sue to recover money for the government in cases of fraud and corruption. Because the injury to any single taxpayer is undifferentiated from that suffered by all others, standing is barred. The prudential rule against plaintiffs asserting a generalized grievance precludes taxpayer class actions unless statutory authority exists for such litigation.
B. THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR TAXPAYER CLASS ACTIONS
Unfortunately, there is currently no statutory authority for taxpayer class actions against fraud and corruption. The only potential basis for such suits, the False Claims Act, 8 7 has been restricted by legislative and judicial action so that it no longer provides a realistic opportunity for private litigation. 194 In Hess, the defendants, electrical contractors, were charged with defrauding Public Works Administration funded projects. Through bid-rigging and collusion, the contractors were alleged to have cheated the government out of more than $100,000.195 The contractors were indicted and entered pleas of nolo contendere. Soon thereafter, a private plaintiff copied the government's indictment and brought suit against the defendant under the False Claims Act. The trial court ruled Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented for payment or approval . . .any claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, or who enters into any agreement, combination or conspiracy to defraud the government. . . by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claims. . 
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in favor of the plaintiff and awarded a judgment of $315,000, $203,000 for double damages and $112,000 for 56 forfeitures at $2,000 each. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that such civil liability violated the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. 196 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, affirming the district court's decision. The Court held "that there was no double jeopardy since the former governmental action was criminal and the instant qui tam action was civil and remedial." 19 7 Justice Jackson dissented arguing that it was absurd to allow plaintiffs to bring suit and recover simply by copying an indictment previously filed by the government. 1 98 Immediately after the Court announced the Hess decision, the Justice Department asked Congress to amend the False Claims act to bar suits based on information possessed by the government.' 9 9 Congress quickly amended the Act's qui tam provisions so as to virtually eliminate citizen suits. Most importantly, Congress established a jurisdictional limitation on private litigation. The False Claims Act was amended to provide that:
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit ... whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer, of employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought. Furthermore, the court does not have jurisdiction over a citizen's suit if anyone in the government knows of the information on which the suit is based. 20 7 It is irrelevant that the government does not plan to utilize the information or bring suit. So long as someone in the government knows the information, all private citizens are forever barred from initiating litigation.
This provision, and its restrictive interpretation, virtually eliminated qui tam suits. "It is hard to imagine a situation where a private plaintiff will learn enough about the government's dealing with a defendant to bring an action before the government itself learns of the information. '208 The False Claims Act is not an authorization for taxpayer actions against fraud and corruption because it is "unlikely that more than a very few civilian plaintiffs will acquire enough sufficiently solid information to justify the expense of filing an action without having the information on which the suit is based also being known by the government. '20 9 One recent example of the effect of the jurisdictional bar is United Congress, of course, may not abrogate the Article III standing barriers. 22 1 Taxpayer litigation pursuant to Congressional authorization, however, would fulfill all of the constitutional standing requirements. First, "injury in fact" would be present in such taxpayer suits. A statute allowing individuals to sue to recover money for the government would create a legal right on the part of all taxpayers to have government money spent without fraud. 222 Therefore, a citizen seeking to recover money against the government would allege a sufficient injury because "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute. ' 223 Under the current standing law, "someone is 'injured in fact' by an action for purposes of Article III if the person has a statutory right to complain of the action in federal court.
court. The Freedom of Information Act allows any person whose request for information has been denied to sue in federal district court to compel the government to release the requested documents. 232 In all of these statutes, citizens who share an injury common to all members of the public are given authority to sue in federal court. Not a single statute granting citizen or taxpayer standing ever has been struck down. Because the bar against taxpayer litigation is prudential, and not constitutional, Congress clearly has the authority to enact legislation authorizing taxpayer suits to recover money for the government in instances of fraud and corruption.
B. PROPOSED STATUTORY PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING TAXPAYER
CLASS ACTIONS TO RECOVER MONEY AND PROPERTY FOR THE GOVERNMENT
The statute creating authority for taxpayer litigation to recover money and property for the government should contain provisions setting forth the cause of action, jurisdiction, the relationship of the citizen's suit to the government, and remedies. Each of these areas merits separate consideration.
. The Cause of Action
Currently, many statutes allow the United States to sue to recover government money and property from those who are not entitled to pos- create civil causes of action to recover government funds. Rather than create a new cause of action for taxpayer suits, the most effective approach is to grant taxpayer's standing to sue under existing laws. A law enacting a new cause of action would present numerous problems of definition, both in drafting the statute and in subsequent judicial interpretation. A bill to establish a new cause of action would have to define who may be liable; the bases for liability; and the mental state required for liability. By relying on existing statutory causes of action, the drafting problems are avoided, because each of these elements have been defined and case law has developed interpreting them. 238 Thus, the statute simply would establish authority for taxpayer standing to sue to recover money or property for the government under any statute which would allow such suits by the United States Attorney General. The taxpayer would have standing in federal court if he or she alleged grounds sufficient to state a cause of action under any statute which would authorize such suit to be brought by the federal government. The taxpayer plaintiff would sue on behalf of the United States of America to recover money for it. 239 The only exception would be for tax cases. Because of the complexity of the tax laws and the need for uniform enforcement, the government should not allow private citizens to bring suits to recover tax deficiencies for the government. In fact, the existence of a large enforcement agency, the Internal Revenue Service, makes taxpayer standing less essential to enforcement than it is in fraud cases.
jurisdictional Provisions
Standing to bring a civil suit in cases of government fraud should be granted to any taxpayer of the United States. That is, if a complaint alleges that the plaintiff paid any taxes to the United States government within the previous year, standing exists. Though the grant of standing could be drafted more expansively to allow any citizen to sue, it would be best to restrict jurisdiction to taxpayer suits. Although non-taxpayers 239 Of course, the taxpayer bringing suit would receive a portion of the money recovered. 
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